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DOMESTIC RELATIONS*
I. ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
In Burtoff v. Burtoff,I a case of first impression, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals upheld an antenuptial agreement establishing the
spouses' rights to support upon divorce. The Burtoffs were a mature
couple and each had adult children from previous marriages. They entered
into an agreement providing Mrs. Burtoff with a lump-sum payment in
lieu of alimony if they divorced. The size of the payment would depend
on the length of the marriage.2
In upholding an agreement that considered the possibility of a future
divorce, the court of appeals joined a growing number of jurisdictions that
have upheld similar agreements. Formerly, such agreements were widely
held void ab initio on the public policy ground that they encouraged di-
vorce.4 In Burtoff, the court reasoned that since married couples, by
means of an antenuptial agreement, have the right to settle their property
rights upon the death of either spouse, they should also have the right to
make provision for the settlement of their property if they should divorce.
This includes the right to settle the issue of alimony in the antenuptial
agreement.' The court, however, added that such antenuptial agreements
must be carefully reviewed to insure fairness to both parties.6 To insure
such fairness, the court said it would be guided by the traditional stan-
dards employed in making alimony awards.7 When a marriage is of short
duration, like that of the Burtoffs' (less than one year), the court held that
* Cases not included because not sufficiently developmental of the law are: Scott v.
Scott, 415 A.2d 812 (D.C. 1980) (court may not grant custody of child relying solely on
Social Services Department report without first affording the parties the opportunity to ex-
amine and comment on it); Rice v. Rice, 415 A.2d 1378 (D.C. 1980) (court may not modify
an unambiguous separation agreement absent change in circumstances).
1. 418 A.2d 1085 (D.C. 1980).
2. Id at 1087.
3. See, e.g., Pamiawski v. Parniawski, 33 Conn. Supp. 44, 359 A.2d 719 (1976); Posner
v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1970); Volid v. Volid, 6 IlI. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972);
Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506
P.2d 719 (1973).
4. See, e.g., Cohn v. Cohn, 209 Md. 470, 121 A.2d 704 (1956).
5. 418 A.2d at 1088.
6. Id at 1089.
7. Id For a discussion of these factors, see Quarles v. Quarles, 179 F.2d 57 (D.C. Cir.
1949).
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such an agreement is fair and reasonable since it allows each spouse to live
as well as she or he lived before the marriage. 8
In Norris v. Norris,9 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed
the voidance of an antenuptial agreement that waived the wife's right to
alimony in the event of a divorce. The agreement was voided because it
was neither fair and reasonable nor entered into voluntarily and freely
after full disclosure of assets, as District of Columbia law required.' ° Mr.
and Mrs. Norris were middle-aged, both having children by previous mar-
riages. Mr. Norris proposed that his prospective wife sign an antenuptial
agreement waiving all claims against his property-including alimony-in
the event of divorce or his death. Mrs. Norris signed the agreement,
against her attorney's advice and at Mr. Norris' insistence, one hour before
their wedding. The court struck down the agreement for several reasons.
The agreement was unfair because it did not contain any support provision
for Mrs. Norris even though she sacrificed alimony benefits from her pre-
vious husband by remarrying. Secondly, the court looked unfavorably on
the lack of a support provision for a woman who was untrained in any
profession. Finally, the court found that Mr. Norris had failed to disclose
his assets to Mrs. Norris before the agreement, and had not shown that
Mrs. Norris entered into the agreement freely and voluntarily. "
Norris followed the Burtoff standards for evaluating antenuptial agree-
ments. The difference in Burtoff was that the agreement provided for the
wife in the event of divorce, and did not force her to give up a source of
income upon remarrying (Mrs. Burtoff was also professionally trained as a
nurse). In addition, the terms of Mrs. Burtoft's agreement, unlike Mrs.
Norris', were negotiated ultimately by independent counsel. Finally, Mr.
Burtoff had fully disclosed the amount of his wealth;' 2 Mr. Norris had not.
II. MARITAL PROPERTY
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held, in Brice v. Brice,' 3 that
real property-here, the marital home-acquired by the husband shortly
8. 418 A.2d at 1089.
9. 419 A.2d 982 (D.C. 1980).
10. See Burtoffv. Burtoff, 418 A.2d 1085, 1089 (D.C. 1980). The Norris contract speci-
fied that Florida law would govern. In reviewing the agreement, the court of appeals ap-
plied Florida law. However, the court noted that there was no conflict between Florida law
and District of Columbia law, citing Burtoff, 419 A.2d at 984-85. In deciding Burloff, the
court of appeals also applied Florida law. Burtoff, 418 A.2d at 1088-89, citing Posner v.
Posner, 233 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1970) and Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1962).
II. Norris v. Norris, 419 A.2d at 985.
12. Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 A.2d at 1089-90.
13. 411 A.2d 340 (D.C. 1980).
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before the marriage and held solely in his name could not be considered
"marital property" under section 16-910(b) of the District of Columbia
Marriage and Divorce Act of 1977.14 As a result, the property was not
distributable between the spouses upon divorce, and was awarded to the
husband as his "sole and separate" property under section 16-910(a) of the
Act.' 5 Brice is the latest of a very small number of cases that have con-
strued the property division provisions of the 1977 Act.
16
In the first case construing these provisions,' 7 the court said that the
"sole and separate" property exemption was applicable if the untitled
spouse had "little basis for an objectively reasonable expectation of an in-
terest in that property."' 8 In Brice, the court noted that the 1977 Act mani-
fested no intent to abolish the pre-Act standard for measuring that
expectation. Under that standard, the court would distribute individually
owned property to the untitled spouse if that spouse could demonstrate a
legal or equitable interest in it."' Mrs. Brice was unable to do this.2"
14. D.C. CODE §§ 16-910 to -923 (Supp. V 1978). The property division provisions of
the Act read as follows:
Upon the entry of a final decree of annulment or divorce in the absence of a valid ante-
nuptial or postnuptial agreement or a decree of legal separation disposing the property of
the spouses, the court shall:
(a) assign to each party his or her sole and separate property acquired prior to the
marriage, and his or her sole and separate property acquired during the marriage
by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, and any increase thereof, or property acquired
in exchange therefore; and
(b) distribute all other property accumulated during the marriage, regardless of
whether title is held individually or by the parties in a form of joint tenancy or
tenancy by the entireties, in a manner that is equitable, just and reasonable, after
considering all relevant factors including, but not limited to: the duration of the
marriage, any prior marriage of either party, the age, health, occupation, amount
and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, assets, debts, and needs of
each of the parties, provisions for the custody of minor children, whether the distri-
bution is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and the opportunity of each for
future acquisition of assets and income. The court shall also consider each party's
contribution to the acquisition, preservation, appreciation, dissipation or deprecia-
tion in value of the assets subject to distribution under this subsection, and each
party's contribution as a homemaker or to the family unit.
D.C. CODE § 16-910 (Supp. V 1978).
15. 411 A.2d at 344.
16. Two earlier cases are Hemily v. Hemily, 403 A.2d 1139 (D.C. 1979) and Turpin v.
Turpin, 403 A.2d 1144 (D.C. 1979). See generaly Gordon & London, The Marital/Separate
Property Distinction in the District of Columbia, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 939, 946-47 (1980).
17. Hemily v. Hemily, 403 A.2d 1139 (D.C. 1979).
18. 411 A.2d at 342-43, quoting Hemily at 1142-43.
19. 411 A.2d at 343. An equitable interest could be shown if, for example, the untitled
spouse had made disproportionately high payments for maintenance and expenses.
20. 411 A.2d at 344.
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III. ADOPTION
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held, in In re JM.A.L. ,2
that absent the consent of all the parties, a court-ordered revocation of a
relinquishment of parental rights filed in court by the natural parent 22 is
justified only if the relinquishment was involuntary.23 In this case, an
adoption agency had denied a natural mother's petition to rescind her re-
linquishment because she had acted voluntarily. The written consent of all
parties not forthcoming, 24 the court affirmed the lower court's denial of her
petition. The court of appeals explained that certainty in relinquishment is
essential. Adoption agencies and prospective adoptive parents rely on it,
and the best interests of the child demand it.25 The court here extended
the approach it has followed for many years with respect to the revocation
of consent to adoption.26 Under this approach, once a parent's consent is
given and acted upon, it cannot be withdrawn without cause. "Cause"
means a finding that the consent was given involuntarily, i e., induced by
fraud, coercion, material mistake, or similar factors. 27 The court, in In re
JM.A.L., stated that this approach was equally viable in determining the
effect of a relinquishment of parental rights.28
IV. SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
In Reynolds v. Reynolds,29 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
rejected a husband's contention that the separation agreement he had
signed was void because of "misunderstood purpose." Mr. and Mrs. Reyn-
21. 418 A.2d 133 (D.C. 1980).
22. This relinquishment was executed pursuant to D.C. CODE § 32-786(a) (1973).
Adoption is a one or two step process in the District. Pursuant to D.C. CODE § 16-304(a)
(1973), the natural parent may sign a statement consenting to the adoption by another per-
son who is usually identified by the time the natural parent executes the consent. The natu-
ral parent transfers parental rights to the adoptive parent. The two-step procedure is set out
in D.C.CODE § 32-786(a) (1973). The natural parent surrenders the child to an adoption
agency and executes a relinquishment of parental rights that is then recorded and filed with
the Family Division of the Superior Court. The agency is entrusted with the permanent care
and guardianship of the child. In this situation, prospective adoptive parents may or may
not yet be available. The relinquishment vests the agency with parental rights and it then
has the right to consent to the eventual adoption of the child. 418 A.2d at 134-35.
23. 418 A.2d at 136.
24. See D.C. CODE § 32-786(a) (1973).
25. 418 A.2d at 135.
26. Id
27. In re Adoption of a Minor, 144 F.2d 644, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1944); In re Adoption of a
Minor Child, 127 F. Supp. 256, 258 (D.D.C. 1954); In re Adoption of S.E.D., 324 A.2d 200,
202 (D.C. 1974).
28. 418 A.2d at 135.
29. 415 A.2d 535 (D.C. 1980) (per curiam).
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olds had entered into a detailed agreement providing for conveyance of his
interest in the marital home to her. He argued that he made the agreement
not to settle property rights, but only to obtain VA financing for another
home and to make a conciliatory gesture that might lead to reconcilation
with his wife. 30 The court responded by holding that a separation agree-
ment is void only where a party has signed under conditions of fraud, du-
ress, concealment, or overreaching.3' Alternatively, the court said that a
separation agreement would be voided where a party could show that he
suffered emotional distress so extreme that it impaired his mental capacity
and thus deprived him of the ability to comprehend his act of signing.
32
But merely acting on bad advice or because of foolishness is irremediable.
The court concluded that "misunderstood purpose" did not satisfy any of
the tests stated above and that it did not merit inclusion as a new test for
voiding a separation agreement where, as in Reynolds, the agreement set
out the challenging party's rights and obligations in detail.33
Jacqueline Lussier
30. Id at 536.
31. See Lanahan v. Nevius, 317 A.2d 521, 524 (D.C. 1974); Davis v. Davis, 268 A.2d
515, 517 (D.C. 1970); Le Bert-Francis v. Le Bert-Francis, 194 A.2d 662, 664 (D.C. 1963).
32. See Jacobson v. Jacobson, 277 A.2d 280, 283 (D.C. 1971).
33. 415 A.2d at 538.
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